ganized medical staff to both the hospital and the individual doctor will also be clarified. The hospital involved in this discussion may be owned by a governmental unit and hence identified as a "public hospital," but more likely it will be aprivate, non-profit charitable corporation and will be referred to as a "private" hospital. Specifically, this article will explore the differences, if any, between a physician's rights visa-vis the public hospital and his or her rights when a private hospital is involved.
Excluded from this analysis are situations where the doctor is an employee of a hospital or health care institution. Also excluded are cases involving hospitals which limit their service to particular patients (e.g., the mentally ill or children), and university-owned teaching hospitals that impose a faculty appointment in the medical school as a pre-requisite to staff privileges.
In order to understand the basis for the hospital's concern in appointing or re-appointing physicians to its medical staff, it is important to realize that the hospital, as a legal entity, bears the ultimate responsibility for the standards of clinical practice exercised by its entire professional staff. The hospital's governing board (typically refemd to as the board of trustees) has a duty to the institution's patients to exercise reasonable care in the appointment and retention of the independent, fee-forservice uhysicians on their medical The hospital's duty to exercise reasonable care in the selectiun and retention of independent medical practitioners is separate and distinct from the hospital's vicarious liability for patient injuries resulting from malpractice committed in the institution. Torts committed by an employee while carrying out or furthering the business of the employer impose liability on both the employee and the employer. The employee is liable because he or she violated a legally protected interest of the injured third person; the employer is liable because it had the legal right, in theory, to control the means and methods of the employee's work.* Such vicarious liability is found in the familiar doctrine of respondear superior.) The basis of the doctrine is, simply, public policy. It facilitates collection of compensatory damages from a presumably financially responsible party (the employer) while encouraging the employer to supervise and regulate more closely the activities of its employees.
In contrast to vicarious liability is the hospital's direct duty to the patient to use due care in the appointment of independent physicians to its medical staff. When patients sue for a brcach of this duty, it is not necessary to allege and prove that an employment relationship exists between the hospital and the physician, nor is it necessary to prove that the doctor's negligence was within the scope of his or her employment.
Rather, the patient need only allege and establish that the hospital was negligent in appointing or re-appointing the doctor to the medical staff or granting him or her privileges, and that this negligence was the proximate cause of injury or damage to the patient. If the hospital knew or ought to have known that the physician appointed to its staff was incompetent, then liability will at- Other Sources of Doe Rocem Protection Constitutionally, public hospitals must grant due process and equal protection to physicians applying for an appointment to the medical staff and to current members of the staff being subjected to disciplinary proceedings.
Most courts that have addressed this issue, however, have held that private, non-profit hospitals need not accord physicians these rights. Thus, the due process rights of physicians vis-a-vis a hospital do differ depending upon the public or private ownership of the institution. Many commentators have suggested that this dichotomy is neither just nor equitable, since both public and private hospitals serve the same community. Additionally, several sources of law are imposing requirements of reasonableness upon the private hospital that are essentially equivalent to the constitutional standards applicable to public hospitals or those private hospitals deemed involved in state action. These include: (a) the fed- Each of these legally binding standards requires a private hospital to act reasonably and to accord procedural fairness when appointing and disciplining its medical staff. The Conditions of Participation in the Medicare program establish the criteriafor the selection of medical staff as individual character, competence, training, experience, and judgment. These criteria are contained in federal regulations that have the force of law.'* Similarly, the Standards of the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals require that the appointment or re-appointment of physicians, the "specific delineation of clinical privileges, and, the periodic indepth reappraisal of each staff member," be conducted on the basis of the "individual's training and/or experience, current competence, professional ethics, and, ifrequested, health status."'* Similarly, several state court decisions have held that a private, nonprofit hospital must grant physicians the essence of substantive and procedural due process on the basis of public policy and the common law, notwithstanding the lack of a constitutional mandate. This trend was inaugurated in 1%3 when the New Jersey Supreme Court held that a private hospital could not arbitrarily refuse to consider the application of an osteopathic physician, especially where it was the only medical institution in the community. 20 The court reasoned that the hospital was vested with a public interest and possessed a fiduciary relationship to patients and to members of the medical community. In short, the court held that a private, non-profit hospital is not truly "private" in the classical sense of being allowed to deal with licensed physicians on whatever basis or criteria it wishes. Rather, as an institution open to and serving the public, it must act reasonabiy and non-arbitrarily in appointing and retaining medical staff and must utilize a fair procedure for evaluating a physician's credentials.
The New Jersey case has, in essence. been adopted and followed by courts in a number ofjurisdictions.21 "he red& is *&it the range of the hospital's discretion in appointing physicians to its medical staff has been narrowed, while the rights of physicians have been expanded by a standard of reasonableness and a recognition that physicians are entitled to a fair evaluation of their credentials and competence.
It should be noted that in other contexts the law has equated the duties of public and private health care institutions. For example, public and private hospitals that maintain an emergency room may not refuse to see a patient who comes to the facility seeking emergency care relying upon the hospital's representation that it is equipped and staffed to provide such care.'* Similarly, all hospitals that have received federal financial assistance directly or supplemental to the HillBurton Act must provide a certain volume of free care to patients unable to pay." Various sources of law (constitutional, statutory, and administrative regulation) at both the state and federal level of govemment prohibit hospitals and other institutions serving the public from discriminating with respect to accommodations, services, or privileges on the basis of race, color, creed, national origin, and, in some circumstances, sex." Lastly, many states have rejected the application of the doctrine of sovereign immunity which resulted in public hospitals being immune from tort liability, just as courts earlier overturned the doctrine of charitable immunity which resulted in private, non-profit hospitals no longer being immune from tort liability. The Michigan Supreme Court, for example, held in 1960, that it would impose tort liability on a charitable hospital,Z' and in 1978, rejected governmental immunity for a public hospital even though such immunity was granted by statute to any governmental agency performing a "governmental function." For the purpose of tort liability to its patients, the Michigan court held that the ownership and operation of a hospital was not in the category of a "governmental function" sufficient to support a difference between private and public hospitals. 26 Accordingly, both as a matter of developing law and sound managerial policy, all hospitals, public or private, should implement policies observing the essence of both substantive and procedural due process. All hospitals should serve their respective patient and physician communities in accordance with uniform, reasonable, and non-discriminatory standards regardless of whether they are public or private. Fairness and logic, as well as the trend in the law, would seem to suggest that all hospitals should be held to the same standards when appointing physicians to their medical staffs or when delineating clinical privileges.
R.oreasional Standards and Institutional Objectives
Those who resist the view that licensed physicians are entitled to due process and equal protection need not fear that the hospital will be without adequate means to control and monitor the competence of its staff. Courts have generally upheld as reasonable and non-arbitrary any rule or standard bearing a rational relationship to professional standards of patient care, the objectives of the hospital, or the character and ethical behavior of the individual physician. As regards professional standards, courts have sustained hospital by-laws requiring specific documentation of credentials upon application to the hospital,27 delineation of clinical specialty privileges," the monitoring and controlling of staff and summary suspension from the staff ifpatient care is threatened and provided such action is followed by a timely hearing.30 to the objectives of the institution will be upheld as reasonable. For example, hospitals may requin all staff physicians to carry adequate malpractice insurance in order to maintain the fiscal integrity of the hospital.31 Similarly, a hospital can deny appointment on the basis that bed space in a certain department or on a particular service is limited, or on the ground that a sufficient number of certain specialists are currently on the staff.32 To illustrate, a New Jersey court held that a hospital could deny staff appohtments to two qualified surgeons upon evidence that surgical coverage at the hospital was already adequate, that additional surgeons would likely increase the number of surgeries performed, and that the needs of the patient community would not be served by additional surgeries.'J Such decisions by the governing body must, of course, be documented by credible evidence. A blanket momtorium on all staff appointments, especially if enforced inconsistently, will be found to be arbitrary and ~nreasonable.~~ Courts have generally sustained exclusive service contracts entered into by both public and private hospitals so long as they are reasonable and nonSimilarly, rules that rationally relate arbitrary, and even though they tend to restrict appointments to a medical staff. In such arrangements, the hospital contracts with a group of physicians for the provision of specialized professional services, thereby closing the service to all other physicians regardless of their qualifications and competence. Older cases had no hesitation in approving exclusive contracts for radiology and pathol~gy,~' and more recent cases have upheld such agreements for cardiac catheterization, nuclear medicine, and renal hemodialyis.^^ In each case, the hospital was able to show valid reasons, e.g., enhancement of patient care standards, improvement of teaching programs, or administrative efficiency, for its decision to enter into an exclusive contract.
Not all hospital by-law provisions are, however, upheld and certain rules have been struck down as being unreasonable, arbitrary, and without any rational relationship to either standards of patient care or institutional objectives. For example, requirements that all persons appointed to the medical staff be members of the county medical society or some other named professional group have been reje~ted,'~ as have been vague and ambiguous rules stating that clinical privileges could be reduced "in the best interests of the hospital and its patient^."^^ Similarly, a requirement that the doctor's office be located in the same county as the hospital was rejected.39 A rule that required each applicant to the staff to supply two references from current members of the staff, 'O and a requirement of a governmental hospital in rural Tennessee (where there were only six physicians practicing in the entire county) that persons granted major surgical privileges be certified by the American Board of Surgery or be eligible for certification?' were held as unreasonably related to institutional objectives.
By-law provisions thafprovide for the exclusion of an entire class of persons authorized by local law to perform limited health care functions, for example, podiatrists or physician's assistants, may also be rejected as unreasonable and contrary to public policy. 42 If local law grants such individuals rights of limited practice, then it follows that hospitals that are required to act reasonably and non-arbitrarily vis-a-vis the medical or osteopathic physician, should also be required to act reasonably with respeci to the limited pra~titioner.~~ It is not required that full clinical privileges be granted to a practitioner of the healing arts. Rather, hospitals should be required to evaluate fairly, objectively, and based upon reasonable criteria applications for privileges by legally recognized practitioners.u This requires evaluation of the individual's training, experience and competence in relationship to standards of patient care and institutional objectives.
One of the more perplexing current issues is the extent to which a hospital can go in denying a staff appointment or in disciplining a member of its staff for personal behavior considered contrary to generally accepted ethical, social, and m o d mores. One thing is certain: hospital counsel must have a precise set of facts in order to succeed in a move to deny or withdraw staff privileges. However, a physician's wrongful conduct in the past may not per se be a proper basis for denying a current application for appointment. The applying physician carries the burden of providing evidence of his or her reformation and rehabilitation, and when his or her references fail to provide this evidence, the hospital may deny the app~intment.'~ Moreover, the "good character, qualifications, and standing" of the applicant physician are legitimate and justifiable areas of inquiry provided that they are applied fairly and that there is evidence at the hearing that the physician lacked either physical or social fitne~s.'~ "lntolerable personal behavior" consisting of frequent use of unacceptable language and rude behavior in the presence of patients and visitors has been held sufficient to dismiss a physician from the staff." Likewise, a physician's failure to document his "adherence to the ethics of [his] profession, [his] good reputation and [his] ability to work with others," as required by the hospital's medical staff by-laws, was found to be a proper basis for rejecting his application for appointment to the staff."
A recent California case, however, has held that a requirement that applicants for staff privileges be able to work with others must be reasonably related to standards of patient care. If an applicant is rejected, the hospital must be prepared to show that his or her inability to "work with others" presented a "real and substantial danger that patients . . . might receive other than high quality medical care."49 Vague and ambiguous by-law provisions that are susceptible to arbitrary or discriminatory implementation, such as a provision requiring a p plicants to be "temperamentally and psychologically suited for cooperative staff-functions," have also been rejected by the courts.sa is attempting to take away or diminish a physician's privileges, the notice of charges against the doctor must be sufficiently specific to allow him or her to answer. Additionally, in order that the
Procedurnl Due Process
It is often more important to accord physicians procedural due process than it is to be unduly concerned about whether or not a given standard or criterion is "reasonable and nonarbitrary" as a matter of substance. This is because, practically, the denial ofprocedural fairness is more likely to generate hostility and actual litigation by an aggrieved physician. Physicians can better understand a substantive rule they do not agree with than they can accept procedural arbitrariness concerning their application for staff privileges. Also, it is easier for the physician's attorney to attack the procedure by which his or her client was denied a medical staff appointment or subjected to discipline than it is to attack the merits of the rule or requirement. Thus, as a matter of "preventive law," it is advisable for private hospitals to grant the essence of procedural due process to current members of the staff as well as to new applicants, whether or not the law of the particular jurisdiction actually mandates due process. Moreover, hospitals accredited by the Joint Commission are required to adhere to procedural due proces~.~' What is procedural due process? Simply, but accurately, stated as a matter of constitutional law, it is fundamental fairness under all the facts and circumstances. The specific elements of a fair procedural evaluation of a physician's qualifications and competence may thus differ depending upon time, place, and circumstance.
The minimal requirements of procedural due process have been articulated as follows: The physician is entitled to: (1) written notice of reasons for denial of appointment or of the charges against him or her; (2) an opportunity for a timely hearing after such notice; (3) a relatively impartial hearing body; (4) an opportunity to produce evidence and witnesses on his or her behalf and to refute the hospital's proferred evidence; (5) a finding by the hearing body based upon substantial, credible factual evidence; (6) written notice of the hearing body's recommended decision together with the reasons for the decision; and (7) an opportunity to appeal the decision.sz
In the skizition where 2fi institution
It is often more important to accord physicians procedural due process. . . the denial of procedural falrness is more likely to gene* hostility and actual litigation by an aggrieved physician.
doctor may adequately prepare his or her response, he or she is entitled to know in advance of the hearing the particulars of the evidence against him or her, including, for example, incident reports, references to specific cases or alleged deficiencies, and peer review recordss3 Medical and administrative staff are well advised to collect and prepare this information with care and to treat it discretely in order to expedite the proceedings against the allegedly errant physician and to minimize the possibility of a lawsuit.
H e a r i n g Requirements
The hearing panel can consist exclusively of physicians or it can be composed of both physicians and lay persons. It must be composed of impartial persons. This does not mean, however, that the members need be entirely divorced from and devoid of prior knowledge of the case; rather, the test of constitutional impartiality is "good faith objectivity." Thus, persons asked to render a decision are not disqualified simply for the reason that they had prior knowledge of the situation or because they participated in the original investigation that led to the charges.s4 The premise is that responsible and honest persons within the hospital can make fundamentally fair decisions.
Likewise, the hearing need not conform with the formality and technicality of a courtroom proceeding. Hearing panels do not have the power of subpoena and they cannot compel the attendance of witnesses.ss Therefore, there is no legal right to confront and to cross-examine witnesses unless they testify voluntarily. Cross-examination ofthose who supply adverse information is not an essential ingredient of due process.s6 However, as noted earlier, the doctor must be permitted to present his or her own witnesses and to refute adverse evidence. The burden of proof at the hearing may be placed upon the physician, but the decision must be based uuon and documented by substantial, credible e~idence.~' Further, the decision must be based solely on evidence produced at the hearing, not on knowledge acquired elsewhere.
Several cases have held that the physician is not entitled as a matter of law to representation by legal counsel at the hearing. New Jersey, however, has held to the contrary, subject to reasonable rules specified by the hospital.'* Whether or not to have counsel is the physician's choice: The attorney will be allowed to marshall evidence, explain adverse material, and present argument. In jurisdictions not following New Jersey's rule, the physician should be allowed counsel at the hearing if the hospital's lawyer is present. application for privileges, which must be followed by an opportunity for a hearing, must be timely. Undue or extended " d e f e d ' of an application is violative of due process. In short, a refusal to decide or to provide reasons for the decision, deprives the doctor of a fair hearing. The concept of "fundamental fairness under all circumstances" is the guiding rule. Thus, in one case where the by-laws provided that a hearing would be held within ten days of a request by the doctor (who had been notified of his suspension from the staff) there was no violation of procedural due process when the hearing was convened I5 days after his re-
The 5-day delay was insignificant since the doctor was not damaged or prejudiced by the minor, technical violation of the by-laws.
Generally, the doctor has a right to appeal a recommendation of a hearing committee to the hospital's board of trustees. The appeal to the board can be and should be restricted to reviewing whether by-law provisions were followed and whether there was substantial evidence to support the decision. As mentioned earlier, the final decision is the responsibility of the board. cedure required? As assumed throughout this discussion, the physician is entitled to due process when his or her initial application for appointment is denied or when an existing appointment is not renewed, suspended, or revoked. The Joint Commission requires such procedures when clinical privileges are subject to "curtailment," as well as in cases of suspension or revocation.60 The meaning and definition of "curtailment," however, is not clear. As a matter of practicality, and in the interest of maintaining standards of The notice of denial of a physician's When is a hearing and review pro-
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clinical practice, the following should not be considered curtailments of a physician's privileges: medical staff programs to monitor an individual's professional performance; a letter of reprimand or admonition directed to a physician; a requirement for consultation; or a requirement that a physician seek additional training or education. In short, peer review and quality care monitoring can be implemented without conducting hearings.6' To argue otherwise would be inconsistent with the hospital's duty to monitor the quality of professional practice. In order to avoid problems, this dividing line between peer review of a physician's practice and curtailment, suspension, or revocation of privileges should be concisely explained in the medical staff by-laws.
When a physician has a grievance, he or she must invoke the hearing and appeal procedure provided by the hospital before going to court. As a general principle of administrative law, administrative remedies must be exhausted prior to seeking a solution to the controversy in a judicial proceeding. There are many medical staff appointment cases to this effect.6z
By the same token, the hospital. whether public or private, must follow the provisions of its current b y -l a~s .~~ Thus, even iflocal law does not mandate that a private hospital grant due process to a physician who has been terminated as a staff member, he or she may obtain a court injunction requiring adherence to the procedural requirements set forth in the hospital's own by-laws. As noted earlier, minor, insignificant deviations from by-law provisions do not offend the physician's rights.
A final note is warranted before concluding. A physician-employee is in a different category from physicians appointed to the medical staff. The employed doctor is entitled to neither substantive nor procedural due process. Rather, his or her rights to continued employment depend upon the terms of the employment contract. Unless the contract provides otherwise, either expressly or by implication, the employee can be terminated, as a general rule, without a hearing, without prior notice, and without a statement of the reasons for the termination.6' Similarly, nonrenewal of an exclusive service contract for radiology services does not require a hearing6'
Condudon
In conclusion, it must be emphasized that judicial review of medical staff privilege controversies is limited to determining whether the decision of the hospital's governing board was based upon reasonable, non-arbitrary criteria and accompanied by the requisites of procedural due process. When there is sufficient, credible evidence to support a decision that was reasonable in the circumstances, the court will not interfere and substitute its own judgment for that of the hospital's board. App. 1976) ; contra, Wyatt v. Tahae Forest Hosp. Dist.. 345 P.2d 93 (Cal. App. 1959) .
46. Sosa v. Bd. of Man. of Val Verde Hosp., supra note 1 (physician abandoned obstetrical patients in active labor when they could not pay his fee; possessed an unstable physical demeanor and visible nervousness likely tojeopardize surgical patients; subject to fits of anger and rage; frequently moved the locus of his practice; had pled guilty to two felony charges in the past; had suffered suspension of medical license in Michigan and Texas (since restored in Texas); and failed to supply satisfactory current references).
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